Elasticlave:
An Efficient Memory Model for Enclaves

Jason Zhijingcheng Yu, Shweta Shinde, Trevor E. Carlson, Prateek Saxena

NUS
National University
of Singapore

ETH zürich

# Spatial Isolation in Intel SGX

Applications

Firmware and OS kernel

Applications

Firmware and OS kernel

Applications

Firmware and OS kernel

Hardware

Spatial Isolation in Intel SGX

Applications

Firmware and OS kernel

Hardware

Physical memory

Spatial Isolation in Intel SGX


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
Spatial Isolation in Intel SGX

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Applications

Firmware and OS kernel

Hardware

Enclave memory

Public memory

Physical memory

Spatial Isolation in Intel SGX

Applications

Firmware and OS kernel

AMD SEV
Sanctum
Keystone

Hardware

Enclave memory

Public memory

Physical memory

Limited in data sharing expressiveness

Limited in data sharing expressiveness

apache

python

Limited in data sharing expressiveness

Mutual distrust

apache

python

Limited in data sharing expressiveness

apache

apache enclave memory

python enclave memory

python

Limited in data sharing expressiveness

apache

apache enclave memory

python

python enclave memory

Limited in data sharing expressiveness

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apache

Untrusted software

encrypt

apache enclave memory

python enclave memory

decrypt

Public memory

python

Client-server

2 extra copies +
encryption/decryption

Similar in other patterns:
- Producer-consumer
- Proxy

Huge Overhead of Spatial Isolation

Contributions

- Malicious OS

Threat Model

- Malicious OS

- Mutually distrusting applications (compromised during runtime)

Threat Model

- Malicious OS

- Mutually distrusting applications (compromised during runtime)

- DoS attacks are out of scope

Spatial isolation: memory region is either always private or always public

Temporal isolation: different enclaves may access memory region at different times

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apache

shared memory region

python

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Spatial isolation: memory region is either always private or always public

Temporal isolation: different enclaves may access memory region at different times

No extra copies or encryption/decryption

Each memory region has exactly one enclave as its owner

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Only owner can access the memory region

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Owner can pass ownership to others

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apache   writes   python

owns

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apache   ⊘   writes   python

owns

Problem: Sharer has no control over how data is accessed after sharing

How does Elasticlave solve this?

~~Transferring ownership~~ fixed owner

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Owner sets *maximum permissions* for other enclaves

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Maximum permissions limit how other enclaves access the memory region

~~Transferring ownership~~ fixed owner

Owner sets *maximum permissions* for other enclaves

Maximum permissions limit how other enclaves access the memory region

apache

owns

executes

python

apache

executes

python

owns

Problem: Accessors cannot enforce their own memory protection permissions

apache

owns

max: *RX*

python

apache

max: *RX*
effective: ∅   python

owns

Each enclave can request hardware to change *its own* effective permissions dynamically

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For any (enclave, memory region) pair,
effective permissions ≤ maximum permissions

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apache

python

max: *RX*
effective: *RW*

owns

For any (enclave, memory region) pair,
effective permissions ≤ maximum permissions

apache

python

owns

max: *RX*
effective: ~~RW~~

Exception

apache

max: *RWX*
effective: *R*

max: *R*
effective: *R*

python

reads

owns

apache

max: *RWX*
effective: *RW*

writes

owns

max: *R*
effective: *R*

reads

python

TOCTTOU

apache

max: *RWX*
effective: *RW*

writes

owns

max: *R*
effective: *R*

reads

python

Problem: No mechanism for synchronization

apache   max: *RWX*
effective: *RW*

writes

max: *R*
effective: *R*   python

reads

owns

apache   max: *RWX*
          effective: *RW*

          writes

          max: *RL*   python
          effective: *RL*

          reads

          owns

When held in effective permissions:
exclusive access guaranteed

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exclusive access guaranteed

Three elements:

- Maximum permissions

Three elements:

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- Effective permissions ($\leq$ maximum permissions)

Three elements:

- Maximum permissions

- Effective permissions ($\leq$ maximum permissions)

- Synchronization: lock bit

Implementation

CPU

Rocket Core

Implementation

U-mode

Normal applications | apache | python

S-mode

OS kernel

M-mode

Security monitor

7 Elasticlave instructions: `create`, `share`, `change`, `...`

CPU

Rocket Core

U-mode | Normal applications | apache | python

S-mode | OS kernel

max: $R\boldsymbol{L}$
effective: $R\boldsymbol{L}$

M-mode | Security monitor

Physical memory

CPU | Rocket Core | ... PMP entries

1 memory region ↔ 1 PMP entry

Implementation

Evaluation question: Performance of Elasticlave compared to spatial isolation

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Benchmarks:

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- Handcrafted microbenchmarks for data sharing patterns

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Baselines:

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- Native Linux execution

Run on cycle-accurate FPGA-accelerated simulator (FireSim)

Two enclaves performing parallel computation

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Elasticlave: memory region accessible to both enclaves

SPLASH-2 (sharing-intensive)

Two enclaves performing parallel computation

Elasticlave: memory region accessible to both enclaves

Spatial isolation: passing data through extra copies and encryption/decryption

SPLASH-2 (sharing-intensive)

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**Elasticlave:** memory region accessible to both enclaves

Spatial isolation: passing data through extra copies and encryption/decryption

**Native:** two threads

Evaluation Results on SPLASH-2 (sharing-intensive)

(a) ELASTICLAVE-full

(b) ELASTICLAVE-nolock

(c) spatial

(a) Producer-consumer

(b) Client-server

(c) Proxy

- Elasticlave: maximum permissions, effective permissions, lock bit

Conclusions

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- Elasticlave: maximum permissions, effective permissions, lock bit

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- Evaluation: 1-2 orders of magnitude performance improvement

**ARTIFACT
EVALUATED**

usenix
ASSOCIATION

AVAILABLE

Artifact available: `https://github.com/jasonyu1996/elasticlave`

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Thanks for listening!