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Published in The Straits Times, July 9, 20023
ONLINE FRAUD
Hacker moved
$62,000 in just an hour
China national then withdrew
money, fled to Malaysia
By
Sharmilpal Kaur
IT TOOK just one hour for the
hacker who broke into the computers of 21 DBS
Internet Banking account-holders to move
$62,000 of their money into his
own DBS account.
And within the next hour, the
30-year-old Chinese national walked into a DBS Bank
branch, withdrew the money and made his getaway by
heading across the Causeway to Malaysia.
DBS Bank revealed this yesterday
at a press conference to explain how a hacker had
made off with the money on June 19 without breaching
or triggering the bank's Internet defences.
Investigations so far show that
the bank's computer security systems were not
breached, nor was the hacking carried out by one of
its employees.
The head of the bank's corporate
security, Mr Ng Peng Khian, said there was a high
possibility that the culprit had hacked into the
victims' computers instead.
Using a Trojan Horse program, he
could have captured the user-identification codes
and passwords to access their online accounts.
About two weeks before he
withdrew the money, he entered the victims' online
accounts to make sure that the user IDs and
passwords were still valid.
Describing what happened on June
19 itself, Mr Ng said: 'He started at 8.19 am, and
managed to penetrate the accounts of 21 bank
customers. He stopped at 9.20 am.'
From each account, he took
between $200 and $4,999, the maximum transfer limit
allowed.
'At 9.56 am, he turned up at one
of our branches and made a withdrawal.'
He withdrew $62,000, the total he
had stolen from the 21 accounts, but did not empty
out his own account.
He then fled across the Causeway
to Malaysia.
DBS was alerted to the missing
funds that afternoon, when the first victim called
the bank. The other 20 customers were alerted by the
bank when it traced the movement of the funds.
DBS has since refunded all 21
account-holders, but future victims may not be as
lucky. Said the bank's head of personal banking, Ms
Elsie Foh: 'Naturally, if it is not our fault, we
would like our Internet users to be aware that there
are risks.
'And if they are not taking the
necessary precautions, then I do not see how the
liability can be put onto anyone who is actually not
responsible or accountable for it.'
As to whether the bank would
consider informing a customer before approving the
online transfer of funds, Ms Foh said that, two
years ago, the bank used to delay online transfers
for two days to give customers enough time to stop a
transaction.
But this was dropped and
transfers were made immediate after customers said
they wanted the transactions done speedily.
To help its 370,000 online
customers tighten security, Ms Foh said the bank
plans to offer anti-virus programs at a discount.
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APRIL 28,
20044
One jumps over
the firewall
By
Chua Hian Hou
An
obscure Trojan program was what the
suspect, Chinese national Sun Rong,
used to commit Singapore's biggest
Internet banking fraud.
He
had remotely implanted the virus
into his victims' computers. With
it, he identified his targets,
captured their passwords, and
transferred money from their DBS
online accounts to his own. He then
went to an ATM to withdraw their
money - $62,000 in all - and fled
town. All in two hours flat.
The
police acted on the report of Mr
Firdaus bin Mohamed Akber who had
discovered that $5,000 from his DBS
bank account had been directed to an
unknown account.
Piecing the jigsaw
The
Singapore Police Force's Technology
Crime Investigation Branch (TCIB)
investigators were led by Senior
Staff Sergeant Michael Hung, 27. A
veteran investigator, he had (then)
five years experience in solving
techno-crimes.
DBS'
counter-fraud team gave them key
information including Sun Rong's
name, the names of 19 victims apart
from Mr Firdaus, and the IP
addresses of the computers hacked.
Then
30, Sun Rong was here on an
employment pass. He had been sacked
for 'unsatisfactory work
performance'.
TCIB
turned to the Singapore Immigration
& Registration, now called the
Immigration and Checkpoints
Authority (ICA). Too late, the man
had skipped town. From data logs
from the bank, Singapore Cable
Vision (SCV) and ICA, the TCIB team
pieced together what happened.
June
19, the day of the crime:
8.30am: Sun Rong accessed and
transferred money from the 20
victims' bank accounts to his own,
via a SCV broadband Internet
account.
9.20am: Left his Jurong West flat
for a DBS branch nearby.
9.56am: Withdrew his ill-gotten
gains.
10:35am: Left town via the Woodlands
Checkpoint.
June
20:
4.15pm: TCIB raided Sun Rong's
rented flat. They found a computer -
minus the hard disk and broadband
modem.
'The
suspect was clever enough to remove
items which could have given us
clues to how he committed the crime
- the hard disk, obviously, and the
cable modem, which had a unique
network serial number that could
link him to the actual transfer,'
said Senior Staff Sgt Hung.
Getting the picture
To
find out how Sun Rong got hold of
his victim's Internet banking IDs
and passwords, TCIB asked the
victims to bring their computers in
for forensic checks. Only 12 of the
victims cooperated. The rest
declined, for reasons of
confidentiality.
The
investigators cloned the hard disks
of the computers they had, careful
to keep the originals intact in case
they were needed as evidence.
Suspecting that a virus or other
malicious software had been used,
they scanned the machines with
anti-virus software. To their
surprise, the scan turned up empty.
They dug deeper. The computers'
registries and event logs were
turned inside out. Here, they
discovered that all the victims had
a suspicious executable file named 'dk.exe'.
Further tests, together with
scientists from the Defence Science
Organisation (DSO) revealed that the
program was Dark Angel 2.5, an
obscure Trojan program from China.
This
was why it had eluded even updated
commercial anti-virus programs that
the TCIB team originally used. When
executed, Dark Angel captures
keystrokes and sends the details to
a designated e-mail address. It even
formats the captured information in
neat reader-friendly fields to make
it easy for the hacker to find the
DBS bank account users, their user
names and passwords.
One
final question remained: How did Sun
Rong manage to implant the Trojan
program onto his victims' desktops?
'We know it was done remotely, since
he did not have physical access to
his victims' computers, but without
the suspect's confession or his hard
disk, we do not know the specific
method used to do this,' said Senior
Staff Sgt Hung.
A few
months after the event, Sun Rong
logged into his DBS account again.
This login was traced to an Internet
service provider in Shanghai. TCIB
contacted the Chinese authorities,
who confirmed that the suspect had
returned to China. Singapore does
not have extradition rights.
'We
are working with the Chinese
authorities to try and bring closure
to this case,' said Senior Staff Sgt
Hung.
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