# Probabilistic Proof Systems 

CS 6230: Topics in Information Security

## Lecture 13: Retrospective

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## Lecture Plan

1. What we saw
2. What we did not see

## Non-Classical Proof Systems

- Studied by computer scientists since the 80 's
- New notions of what it means to "prove" something
- Vastly more "powerful" than classical proofs
- We will study some of these along with:
- their applications,
- connections to complexity theory and cryptography, and,
- relevant tools from cryptography and TCS


## Interactive Proofs

$$
\begin{gathered}
\qquad I P=P S P A C E \\
\text { Sumcheck Protocol } \\
\text { Utility of Low-Degree Polynomials }
\end{gathered}
$$

Goldwasser-Sipser Set Lower Bound Protocol

Error Reduction, Round Reduction, etc.

Doubly Efficient IPs, the GKR Protocol, Delegation of Computation

# Zero-Knowledge Proofs 

Simulation-based definition

CZK for NP using commitments

SZK and distances between distributions

Completeness of the Statistical Closeness problem

Closure properties of SZK

# Probabilistically Checkable Proofs 

Definition with Proof oracle

> Relation to IPs

The PCP Theorem

Hardness of Approximation

Hadamard PCP for systems of linear (and quadratic) equations

Linearity Testing

## Arguments

Definition of Computational Soundness

Kilian's Construction of Succinct Arguments from PCPs

Collision-resistance and Merkle Hashing

Fiat-Shamir transformation to non-interactive arguments

Schnorr Identification (and Signature) Scheme using Discrete Log

Proof of Knowledge

## Arguments

$\left.\begin{array}{ccc}\begin{array}{c}\text { Information-Theoretic } \\ \text { Proof System }\end{array} & + & \text { Cryptography }\end{array} \begin{array}{c}\text { Fiat-Shamir }\end{array} \begin{array}{c}\text { Non-Interactive Argument } \\ \text { of Knowledge (SNARK) }\end{array}\right]$

## Multi-Prover IP

(no communication among $P_{i}$ 's)


Straightforward connection to PCPs

Usual completeness and soundness requirements

$$
M I P=N E X P
$$

## Interactive Oracle Proof

$P$ V


Usual completeness and soundness requirements

## Proof of Proximity

$V$ runs in sub-linear time in $|x|$

Completeness: Accept if $x \in L$

Soundness: Reject if $x$ is far from every $x^{\prime} \in L$

Without a prover, called property testing Eg: linearity testing, low-degree testing

Useful in constructing PCPs, IOPs

## Batch Verification

Suppose $L$ has IP with $c$ bits of communication

How much communication needed to prove $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}$ are all in $L$ ?

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { Repeat IP } k \text { times: } k \cdot c \\
\text { Use } I P=P S P A C E: c \cdot \operatorname{polylog}(k) \\
\text { (but loses any interesting properties of original IP) }
\end{gathered}
$$

[RRR16,RR20]: Batching for $U P$ while preserving prover efficiency
[KRRSV20,KRV21]: Batching for non-interactive $S Z K$ while preserving zero-knowledge

## Entropy Difference

Another complete problem for $S Z K$

For circuit $C:\{0,1\}^{m} \rightarrow\{0,1\}^{n}$,
$H(C)$ - Shannon entropy of distribution of outputs on uniformly random input

Given $C_{0}, C_{1}$ such that $\left|H\left(C_{0}\right)-H\left(C_{1}\right)\right|>1$, decide whether $H\left(C_{0}\right)>H\left(C_{1}\right)$ or other way round

Reduces to Statistical Closeness using the Leftover Hash Lemma

Proof of completeness similar to what we saw for SC

## Coin-Tossing Protocols

Agreement: When $A$ and $B$ are both honest, $b_{A}=b_{B}$, distributed uniformly

## $A\left(r_{A}\right)$ <br> $B\left(r_{B}\right)$

Unbiasable: Irrespective of what $B$ does, $b_{A}$ is almost uniform (and vice versa)

Useful, e.g., in transforming public-coin HVZK proofs to malicious verifier ZK proofs

Many different notions of security studied, Various constructions, impossibilities known

## So Much More...

Secure Multi-Party Computation

Non-blackbox simulation in ZK proofs

Correlation Intractability and recent developments in the Fiat-Shamir methodology

## In Conclusion

- Randomness and interaction are powerful
- Polynomials are amazing
- You never know what could be practical in twenty years

