

Trust Models—Public Key vs. Symmetric Key

Public-Key World

- ▶ Hierarchy of Trust.
- ▶ Cross Domain Certification.
- ▶ Web of Trust.

Authentication

Alice \longrightarrow Bob.

Concerns: Eavesdropping, Exposing secrets on server.

Goal: No secrets on the server + foil eavesdropping.

Methods: Passwords, One-Time Passwords, Challenge-Response protocols, Zero-Knowledge authentication.

In typical environments, authentication has to be combined with session key exchange protocol (for encryption/authentication) to foil session hijacking.

Passwords

- ▶ Used to authenticate people.
- ▶ Have low entropy (≈ 25 bits).
- ▶ Susceptible to eavesdropping, replay to server.

A \longrightarrow B

pwd_1
pwd_2
\vdots
pwd_n

-
- ▶ Never store passwords on the server.
 - ▶ Store the password hash instead. Don't need the ability to invert. If this file is exposed an adversary can mount a dictionary attack.
for(every word w in dictionary) { compute $h(w)$ }
look for $h(w)$ in the password hash file.

Unix uses a modified DES algorithm with 12 bits of salt—a two-char string from the set [a-zA-Z0-9./]. It is used to perturb the algorithm in one of 4096 different ways. Usually encrypts 0 with the key 25 times. The value stored in the password file is a series of 13 printable ASCII characters (the first two characters are the 12-bit salt itself and the remaining 11 characters encode the 64-bit encryption of 0). See crypt(3).

Suppose 10M words in dictionary, 12 bit salt: then we have $10M \times 4K = 40G$ encrypted passwords. Assuming average length of 8 bytes gives 320GB.

If one encryption is done in one μs , the dictionary can be encrypted in $40 \times 10^9 \times 10^{-6} = 4 \times 10^4 s \approx 10$ hours.

Passwords—Salting

Salt makes dictionary attack harder. An attacker must hash every word in the dictionary 2^{12} times. Logically, it looks like:

Alice	salt_a	$h(P_a \text{salt}_a)$
Bob	salt_b	$h(P_b \text{salt}_b)$

Secret Salt:

Store Alice | salt_a | $h(P_a || \text{salt}_a || \text{salt}_{a'})$

$\text{salt}_{a'}$ is 4 bits. To verify a user's password, the system tries all 2^4 combinations of $\text{salt}_{a'}$. Attacker's work goes up by 16.

Biometrics

One-Time Passwords

Lamport hash (S/Key) based on hash-chain [KPS02].

- ▶ Alice remembers a password p .
- ▶ Bob (server) remembers $(user, n, h^n(p))$.
- ▶ $A \rightarrow B$: A (I am Alice)
- ▶ $B \rightarrow A$: n
- ▶ $A \rightarrow B$: $x = h^{n-1}(p)$

Pros and Cons:

- ▶ Can only log in a finite # of times.
- ▶ No mutual authentication.
- ▶ Small n attack. What if Alice can be tricked into revealing $h^{50}(p)$.

References

- [KPS02] Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman, and Mike Speciner. *Network Security—Private Communication in a Public World*. Prentice Hall PTR, 2nd edition, 2002.