


# What is a Lattice?

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
Consider the relation “smarter than” in the following diagram.



- ▶  $\rightarrow$  is reflexive and transitive.
- ▶  $\rightarrow$  is antisymmetric.
- ▶ Not every pair of elements is comparable.
- ▶  $\forall a, b \exists$  unique least upper bound  $x \mid x \geq a$  and  $x \geq b$ .
- ▶  $\forall a, b \exists$  unique greatest lower bound  $y \mid y \leq a$  and  $y \leq b$ .

## A Military Security Lattice?


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- ▶ Top Secret  $\geq$  Secret  $\geq$  Confidential  $\geq$  Unclassified.
- ▶ Someone authorized for the B2 bomber need not know about the Yellow submarine.

# Bell-La Padula


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- ▶ Intended for confidentiality.
- ▶ Information only flows “up”.
  - ss: can only read down.
  - ★: can only write up.
- ▶  $\text{Level}(x, y, z, \dots) = \max(\text{Level}(x), \text{Level}(y), \dots)$ .

# Biba


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- ▶ Intended for integrity. For e.g., contamination in a wafer fab plant.
- ▶ Information only flows “down”.
  - ss: can only write down.
  - \*: can only read up.
- ▶  $\text{Level}(x, y, z, \dots) = \min(\text{Level}(x), \text{Level}(y), \dots)$ .

# Chinese Wall

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- ▶ Intended for “conflict of interest” type policies.
- ▶ Access not constrained by attributes of data, but by what subject already holds access rights to.
- ▶ Information doesn't flows within a conflict class.
  - ss: can only access one data set within a conflict class.
  - \*: cannot read from a different company dataset than the one to which write access is requested.

If you can change information about “Sun”, then you can't read from “Bata” or “Ford”.

## Clark Wilson

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- ▶ Intended primarily for commercial integrity settings.

For that core of commercial data processing that relates to management and accounting for assets, preventing fraud and error is the primary goal [CW87].

- ▶ Well-formed transaction and Separation of duty.
  - Users should not manipulate data arbitrarily, but only in constrained ways that preserve or ensure the integrity of the data.
  - Separate all operations into subparts and require each subpart to be executed by a different person.
  - A data item is not necessarily associated with a particular security level, but rather with a set of programs permitted to manipulate it. Implemented as (user, program) determine which objects can be written to.

## References

- [CW87] David D. Clarke and David R. Wilson. A comparison of commercial and military computer security policies. *IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy*, pages 184–194, 1987.