On the Privacy Risks of Model Explanations

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ABSTRACT

Privacy and transparency are two key foundations of trustworthy machine learning. Model explanations offer insights into a model's decisions on input data, whereas privacy is primarily concerned with protecting information about the training data. We analyze connections between model explanations and the leakage of sensitive information about the model's training set. We investigate the privacy risks of feature-based model explanations using membership inference attacks: quantifying how much model predictions plus their explanations leak information about the presence of a datapoint in the training set of a model. We extensively evaluate membership inference attacks based on feature-based model explanations, over a variety of datasets. We show that backpropagationbased explanations can leak a significant amount of information about individual training datapoints. This is because they reveal statistical information about the decision boundaries of the model about an input, which can reveal its membership. We also empirically investigate the trade-off between privacy and explanation quality, by studying the perturbation-based model explanations.

CCS CONCEPTS

• Computing methodologies → Machine learning; • Security and privacy;

KEYWORDS

model explanations, membership inference, privacy

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1 INTRODUCTION

Black-box machine learning models are often used to make highstakes decisions in sensitive domains. However, their inherent complexity makes it extremely difficult to understand the *reasoning* underlying their predictions. This development has resulted in increasing pressure from the general public and government agencies;

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ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-8473-5/21/05...\$15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3461702.3462533 several proposals advocate for deploying (automated) *model explanations* [21]. In recent years, novel explanation frameworks have been put forward; Google, Microsoft, and IBM now offer model explanation toolkits as part of their ML suites.¹

Model explanations offer users additional information about how the model made a decision with respect to their data records. Releasing additional information is, however, a risky prospect from a privacy perspective. The explanations, as functions of the model trained on a private dataset, might inadvertently leak information about the training set, beyond what is necessary to provide useful explanations. Despite this potential risk, there has been little effort to analyze and address any data privacy concerns that might arise due to the release of model explanations. This is where our work comes in. We initiate this line of research by asking the following question: **can an adversary leverage model explanations to infer private information about the training data**?

The established approach to analyze information leakage in machine learning algorithms is to take the perspective of an adversary and design an attack that recovers private information, thus illustrating the deficiencies of existing algorithms (e.g., [3, 29, 39, 54]). In this work, we use adversarial analysis to study existing methods. We focus on a fundamental adversarial analysis, called *membership inference* [40]. In this setting, the adversary tries to determine whether a datapoint is part of the training data of a machine learning algorithm. The success rate of the attack shows how much the model would leak about its individual datapoints.

This approach is not specific to machine learning. [22] demonstrated a successful membership inference attack on aggregated genotype data provided by the US National Institutes of Health and other organizations. This attack was successful despite the NIH witholding public access to their aggregate genome databases [16]. With respect to machine learning systems, the UK's information commissioners office explicitly states membership inference as a threat in its guidance on the AI auditing framework [33]. Beyond its practical and legal aspects, this approach is used to measure model information leakage [40]. Privacy-preserving algorithms need to be designed to establish upper bounds on such leakage (notably using differential privacy algorithms, e.g., [1])

Our Contributions. Our work is the first to extensively analyze the *data* privacy risks that arise from releasing model explanations, which can result in a trade-off between transparency and privacy. This analysis is of great importance, given that model explanations are required to provide transparency about model decisions, and privacy is required to protect sensitive information about the training data. We provide a comprehensive analysis of information leakage on major feature-based model explanations. We analyze both

^{*}The work was done while the author was an assistant professor at NUS.

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¹See http://aix360.mybluemix.net/, https://aka.ms/AzureMLModelInterpretability and https://cloud.google.com/explainable-ai.

backpropagation-based model explanations, with an emphasis on gradient-based methods [7, 24, 43, 47, 53] and *perturbation-based* methods [36, 48]. We assume the adversary provides the input query, and obtains the model prediction as well as the explanation of its decision. We analyze if the adversary can trace whether the query was part of the model's training set.

For gradient-based explanations, we demonstrate **how and to what extent** backpropagation-based explanations leak information about the training data (Section 3). Our results indicate that backpropagation-based explanations are a major source of information leakage. We further study the effectiveness of membership inference attacks based on additional backpropagation-based explanations (including Integrated Gradients and LRP). These attacks achieve comparable, albeit weaker, results than attacks using gradient-based explanations.

We further investigate **why** this type of model explanation leaks membership information (Section 4). Note that the model explanation, in this case, is a vector where each element indicates the influence of each input feature on the model's decision. We demonstrate that the *variance* of a backpropagation-based explanation (i.e, the variance of the influence vector across different features) can help identify the training set members. This link could be partly due to how backpropagation-based training algorithms behave upon convergence. The high variance of an explanation is an indicator for a point being close to a decision boundary, which is more common for datapoints outside the training set. During training the decision boundary is pushed away from the training points.

This observation links the high variance of the explanation to an uncertain prediction and so indirectly to a higher prediction loss. Points close to the decision boundary have both an uncertain prediction and a high variance in their explanation. This insight helps to explain the leakage. High prediction and explanation variance is a good proxy for a higher prediction loss of the model around an input. This is a very helpful signal to the adversary, as membership inference attacks based on the loss are highly accurate [39]: Points with a very high loss tend to be far from the decision boundary and are also more likely to be non-members.

Further, our experiments on synthetic data indicate that the relationship between the variance of an explanation and training data membership is greatly affected by data dimensionality. For low dimensional data, membership is uncorrelated with explanation variance. These datasets are relatively dense. There is less variability for the learned decision boundary and members and non-members are equally likely to be close to it. Interestingly, not even the loss-based attacks are effective in this setting. Increasing the dimensionality of the dataset, and so decreasing its relative density, leads to a better correlation between membership and explanation variance. Finally, when the dimensionality reaches a certain point the correlation decreases again. This decrease is inline with a decrease in training accuracy for the high dimensional data. Here, the model fails to learn.

To provide a better analysis of the trade-off between privacy and transparency, we analyze perturbation-based explanations, such as SmoothGrad [48]. We show that, as expected, these techniques are more resistant to membership inference attacks (Section 5). We, however, attribute this to the fact that they rely on out-of-distribution samples to generate explanations. These outof-distribution samples, however, can have undesirable effects on explanation fidelity [46]. So, these methods can achieve privacy at the cost of the quality of model explanations.

Additional results in supplementary material. In the supplementary material, we study another type of model explanation: the example-based method based on influence-functions proposed by Koh and Liang [25]. This method provides influential training datapoints as explanations for the decision on a particular point of interest. This method presents a clear leakage of training data, and is far more vulnerable to membership inference attacks; in particular, training points are frequently used to explain their own predictions . Hence, for this method, we focus on a more ambitious objective of reconstructing the entire training dataset via **dataset reconstruction attacks** [18].

The challenge here is to recover as many training points as possible. Randomly querying the model does not recover many points. A few peculiar training data records — especially mislabeled training points at the border of multiple classes — have a strong influence over most of the input space. Thus, after a few queries, the set of reconstructed data points converges. We design an algorithm that identifies and constructs regions of the input space where previously recovered points will not be influential . This approach avoids rediscovering already revealed instances and improves the attack's coverage. We prove a worst-case upper bound on the number of recoverable points and show that our algorithm is optimal in the sense that for worst-case settings, it recovers all discoverable datapoints.

Through empirical evaluation of example-based model explanations on various datasets , we show that an attacker **can reconstruct (almost) the entire dataset for high dimensional data**. For datasets with low dimensionality, we develop another heuristic: by adaptivley querying the previously recovered points, we recover significant parts of the training set. Our success is due to the fact that in the data we study, the graph structure induced by the influence function over the training set, tends to have a small number of large strongly connected components, and the attacker is likely to recover at least all points in one of them.

We also study the influence of dataset size on the success of membership inference for example-based explanations. Finally, as unusual points tend to have a larger influence on the training process, we show that the data of **minorities is at a high risk of being revealed**.

2 BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES

We are given a labeled *dataset* $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$, with *n* features and *k* labels. The labeled dataset is used to train a *model c*, which maps each *datapoint* \vec{x} in \mathbb{R}^n to a distribution over *k labels*, indicating its belief that any given label fits \vec{x} . Black-box models often reveal the label deemed *likeliest* to fit the datapoint. The model is defined by a set of *parameters* θ taken from a *parameter space* Θ . We denote the model as a function of its parameters as c_{θ} . A model is trained to empirically minimize a *loss function* over the training data. The loss function $L : X \times \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ takes as input the model parameters θ and a point \vec{x} , and outputs a real-valued loss $L(\vec{x}, \theta) \in \mathbb{R}$. The objective of a machine-learning algorithm is to identify an *empirical loss*

minimizer over the parameter space Θ :

$$\hat{\theta} \in \operatorname{argmin}_{\theta \in \Theta} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{X}|} \sum_{\vec{x} \in \mathcal{X}} L(\vec{x}, \theta)$$
(1)

2.1 Model Explanations

As their name implies, model explanations explain model decisions on a given *point of interest* (POI) $\vec{y} \in \mathbb{R}^n$. An explanation ϕ takes as input the dataset X, labels over X — given by either the true labels $\ell : X \rightarrow [k]$ or by a trained model c — and a *point of interest* $\vec{y} \in$ \mathbb{R}^n . Explanation methods sometimes assume access to additional information, such as active access to model queries (e.g. [2, 15, 36]), a prior over the data distribution [7], knowledge of the model class (e.g. that the model is a neural network [6, 42, 53], or that we know the source code [14, 37]). We assume that the explanation function $\phi(X, c, \vec{y}, \cdot)$ is *feature-based* (here the \cdot operator stands for potential additional inputs), and often refer to the explanation of the POI \vec{y} as $\phi(\vec{y})$, omitting its other inputs when they are clear from context.

The *i*-th coordinate of a feature-based explanation, $\phi_i(\vec{y})$ is the degree to which the *i*-th feature influences the label assigned to \vec{y} . Generally speaking, high values of $\phi_i(\vec{y})$ imply a greater degree of effect; negative values imply an effect for *other labels*; a $\phi_i(\vec{y})$ close to 0 normally implies that feature *i* was largely irrelevant. Ancona et al. [5] provide an overview of feature-based explanations (also called attribution methods). Many feature-based explanation techniques are implemented in the INNVESTIGATE library² [4] which we use in our experiments. Let us briefly review the explanations we analyze in this work.

2.1.1 Backpropagation-Based Explanations. Backpropagation-based methods rely on a small number of backpropagations through a model to attribute influence from the prediction back to each feature. The canonical example of this type of explanation is the gradient with respect to the input features [44], we focus our analysis on this explanation. Other backpropagation-based explanations have been proposed [7, 24, 43, 47, 48, 53].

Gradients. Simonyan, Vedaldi, and Zisserman [44] introduce gradient-based explanations to visualize image classification models, i.e. $\phi_i(\vec{y}) = \frac{\partial c}{\partial x_i}(\vec{y})$. The authors utilize the absolute value of the gradient, i.e. $\left|\frac{\partial c}{\partial x_i}(\vec{y})\right|$; however, outside image classification, it is reasonable to consider negative values, as we do in this work. We denote gradient-based explanations as ϕ_{GRAD} . Shrikumar, Greenside, and Kundaje [43] propose setting $\phi_i(\vec{y}) = y_i \times \frac{\partial c}{\partial x_i}(\vec{y})$ as a method to enhance numerical explanations. Note that since an adversary would have access to \vec{y} , releasing its Hadamard product with $\phi_{GRAD}(\vec{y})$ is equivalent to releasing $\phi_{GRAD}(\vec{y})$.

Integrated Gradients. Sundararajan, Taly, and Yan [53] argue that instead of focusing on the gradient it is better to compute the average gradient on a linear path to a baseline \vec{x}_{BL} (often $\vec{x}_{BL} = \vec{0}$). This approach satisfies three desirable axioms: sensitivity, implementation invariance and a form of completeness. Sensitivity means that given a point $\vec{x} \in X$ such that $x_i \neq x_{BL,i}$ and $c(\vec{x}) \neq c(\vec{x}_{BL})$, then $\phi_i(\vec{x}) \neq 0$; completeness means that $\sum_{i=1}^n \phi_i(\vec{x}) = c(\vec{x}) - c(\vec{x}_{BL})$. Mathematically the explanation can be formulated as

$$\phi_{INTG}(\vec{x})_i \triangleq (x_i - \vec{x}_{BL,i}) \cdot \int_{\alpha=0}^{1} \frac{\partial c(\vec{x}^{\alpha})}{\partial \vec{x}_i^{\alpha}} \bigg|_{\vec{x}^{\alpha} = \vec{x} + \alpha(\vec{x} - \vec{x}_{BL})}$$

Guided Backpropagation. Guided Backpropagation [50] is a method specifically designed for networks with ReLu activations. It is a modified version of the gradient where during backpropagation only paths are taken into account that have positive weights and positive ReLu activations. Hence, it only considers positive evidence for a specific prediction. While being designed for ReLu activations it can also be used for networks with other activations.

Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP). Klauschen et al. [24] use backpropagation to map *relevance* back from the output layer to the input features. LRP defines the relevance in the last layer as the output itself and in each previous layer the relevance is redistributed according to the weighted contribution of the neurons in the previous layer to the neurons in the current layer. The final attributions for the input \vec{x} are defined as the attributions of the input layer. We refer to this explanation as $\phi_{LRP}(\vec{x})$.

2.1.2 *Perturbation-Based Explanations.* Perturbation-based methods query the to-be-explained model on many perturbed inputs. They either treat the model as a black-box [13, 36], need predictions for counterfactuals [13], or 'smooth' the explanation [48]. They can be seen as local linear approximations of a model.

SmoothGrad. We focus our analysis on SmoothGrad [48], which generates multiple samples by adding Gaussian noise to the input and releases the averaged gradient of these samples. Formally for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\phi_{SMOOTH}(\vec{x}) = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{k} \nabla c(\vec{x} + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma)),$$

where N is the normal distribution and σ is a hyperparameter.

LIME. The LIME (Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations) method [36] creates a local approximation of the model via sampling. Formally it solves the following optimization problem:

$$\phi_{\text{LIME}}(\vec{x}) = \operatorname{argmin}_{g \in G} \mathcal{L}(g, c, \pi_{\vec{x}}) + \Omega(g),$$

where G is a set of simple functions, which are used as explanations, \mathcal{L} measures the approximation quality by g of c in the neighborhood of \vec{x} (measured by $\pi_{\vec{x}}$) and Ω regularizes the complexity of g. While the LIME framework allows for an arbitrary local approximation in practice most commonly used is a linear approximation with Ridge regularization.

2.2 Membership Inference Attacks

We assume the attacker has gained possession of a set of datapoints $S \subset \mathbb{R}^n$, and would like to know which ones are members of the training data. The goal of a membership inference attack is to create a function that accurately predicts whether a point $\vec{x} \in S$ belongs to the training set of *c*. The attacker has a prior belief how many of the points in *S* were used for training. In this work we ensure that half the members of *S* are members of the training set (this is known to the attacker), thus random guessing always has an accuracy of 50%, and is the threshold to beat.

²https://github.com/albermax/innvestigate

Models tend to have lower loss on members of the training set. Several works have exploited this fact to define simple loss-based attacks [29, 39, 54]. The idea is to define a threshold τ : an input \vec{x} with a loss $L(\vec{x}, \theta)$ lower than τ is considered a member; an input with a loss higher is considered a non-member.

$$Membership_{Loss,\tau}(\vec{x}) = \begin{cases} True & \text{if } L(\vec{x},\theta) \leq \tau\\ False & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Sablay rolles et al. [39] show that this attack is optimal given an optimal threshold $\tau_{\rm opt}$, under some assumptions. However, this attack is infeasible when the attacker does not have access to the true labels or the model's loss function.

Hence, we propose to generalize threshold-based attacks to allow different sources of information. For this we use the notion of variance for a given vector $\vec{v} \in \mathbb{R}^{n}$:

$$Var(\vec{v}) \triangleq \sum_{i=1}^{n} (v_i - \mu_{\vec{v}})^2$$
 where $\mu_{\vec{v}} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i$

Explicitly, we consider (i) a threshold on the prediction variance and (ii) a threshold on the explanation variance. The target model usually provides access to both these types of information. Note, however, a target model might *only release the predicted label and an explanation*, making only explanation-based attacks feasible.

Our explanation-based threshold attacks work in a similar manner to other threshold-based attack models: \vec{y} is considered a member iff $Var(\phi(\vec{y})) \leq \tau$.

$$\begin{split} \text{Membership}_{\textit{Pred},\tau}(\vec{x}) &= \begin{cases} True & \text{if } Var(c_{\theta}(\vec{x})) \geq \tau \\ False & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\ \text{Membership}_{\textit{Expl},\tau}(\vec{x}) &= \begin{cases} True & \text{if } Var(\phi(\vec{x})) \leq \tau \\ False & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{split}$$

Intuitively, if the model has a very low loss then its prediction vector will be dominated by the true label. These vectors have higher variance than vectors where the prediction is equally distributed among many labels (indicating model uncertainty). This inference attack breaks in cases where the loss is very high because the model is decisive but wrong. However, as we demonstrate below, this approach offers a fairly accurate attack model for domains where loss-based attacks are effective. Hence, attacks using prediction variance alone still constitute a serious threat. The threshold attack based on explanation variance are similarly motivated. When the model is certain about a prediction, it is also unlikely to change it due to a small local perturbation. Therefore, the influence and attribution of each feature are low, leading to a smaller explanation variance. For points closer to the decision boundary, changing a feature affects the prediction more strongly, leading to higher explanation variance. The loss minimization during training "pushes" points away from the decision boundary. In particular, models using tanh, sigmoid, or softmax activation functions tend to have steeper gradients in the areas where the output changes. Training points generally don't fall into these areas.³ The crucial part for all

threshold-based attacks is obtaining the threshold $\tau.$ We consider two scenarios:

- (1) Optimal threshold For a given set of members and non-members there is a threshold τ_{opt} that achieves the highest possible prediction accuracy for the attacker. This threshold can easily be obtained when datapoint membership is known. Hence, rather than being an actually feasible attack, using τ_{opt} helps estimating the worst case privacy leakage.
- (2) **Reference/Shadow model(s)** This setting assumes that the attacker has access to some labeled data from the target distribution. The attacker trains *s* models on that data and calculates the threshold for these reference (or shadow) models. In line with Kerckhoffs's principle [35] we assume that the attacker has access to the training hyper parameters and model architecture. This attack becomes increasingly resource intensive as *s* grows. For our experiments we choose $s \in \{1, 3\}$. This is a practically feasible attack if the attacker has access to similar data sources.

3 PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF BACKPROPAGATION-BASED EXPLANATIONS

In this section we describe and evaluate our membership inference attack on gradient-based explanation methods. We use the Purchase and Texas datasets in [32]; we also test CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [39], the Adult dataset [17] as well as the Hospital dataset [51]. The last two datasets are the only binary classification tasks considered. Where possible, we use the same training parameters and target architectures as the original papers (see Table 1 for an overview of the datasets). We study four types of information the attacker could use: loss, prediction variance, gradient variance and the SmoothGrad variance.

Table 1: Overview of the target datasets for membership inference

Name	Points	Features	Туре	# Classes
Purchase	197,324	600	Binary	100
Texas	67,330	6,170	Binary	100
CIFAR-100	60,000	3,072	Image	100
CIFAR-10	60,000	3,072	Image	10
Hospital	101,766	127	Mixed	2
Adult	48,842	24	Mixed	2

 Table 2: The average training and testing accuracies of the target models.

	Purchase	Texas	CIFAR	CIFAR	Hospital	Adult
			-100	-10	-	
Train	1.00	0.98	0.97	0.93	0.64	0.85
Test	0.75	0.52	0.29	0.53	0.61	0.85

³The high variance described here results from higher absolute values, in fact instead of the variance an attacker could use the 1-norm. In our experiments, there was no difference between using 1-norm and using variance; we decided to use variance to be more consistent with the prediction based attacks.

3.1 General setup

For all datasets, we first create one big dataset by merging the original training and test dataset, to have a large set of points for sampling. Then, we randomly sample four smaller datasets that are not overlapping. We use the smaller sets to train and test four target models and conduct four attacks. In each instance, the other three models can respectively be used as shadow models. We repeat this process 25 times, producing a total of 100 attacks for each original dataset. Each small dataset is split 50/50 into a training set and testing set. Given the small dataset, the attacker has an a priori belief that 50% of the points are members of the training set, which is the common setting for this type of attack [41].

3.2 Target datasets and architectures

The overview of the datasets is provided in Table 1 and an overview of the target models accuracies in Table 2.

3.2.1 Purchase dataset. The dataset originated from the "Acquire Valued Shoppers Challenge" on Kaggle⁴. The goal of the challenge was to use customer shopping history to predict shopper responses to offers and discounts. For the original membership inference attack, Shokri et al. [41] create a simplified and processed dataset, which we use as well. Each of the 197,324 records corresponds to a customer. The dataset has 600 binary features representing customer shopping behavior. The prediction task is to assign customers to one of 100 given groups (the labels). This learning task is rather challenging, as it is a multi-class learning problem with a large number of labels; moreover, due to the relatively high dimension of the label space, allowing an attacker access to the prediction vector - as is the case in [41] - represents significant access to information. We sub-sampled smaller datasets of 20,000 points i.e. 10,000 training and testing points for each model. We use the same architecture as [32], namely a four-layer fully connected neural network with tanh activations. The layer sizes are [1024, 512, 256, 100]. We trained the model of 50 epochs using the Adagrad optimizer with a learning rate of 0.01 and a learning rate decay of 1e-7.

3.2.2 Texas hospital stays. The Texas Department of State Health Services released hospital discharge data public use files spanning from 2006 to 2009.⁵ The data is about inpatient status at various health facilities. There are four different groups of attributes in each record: general information (e.g., hospital id, length of stay, gender, age, race), the diagnosis, the procedures the patient underwent, and the external causes of injury. The goal of the classification model is to predict the patient's primary procedures based on the remaining attributes (excluding the secondary procedures). The dataset is filtered to include only the 100 most common procedures. The features are transformed to be binary resulting in 6,170 features and 67,330 records. We sub-sampled smaller datasets of 20,000 points i.e. 10,000 training and testing points for each model. As the dataset has only 67,330 points we allowed resampling of points. We use the same architecture as [32], namely a five-layer fully connected neural network with tanh activations. The layer sizes are [2048, 1024, 512, 256, 100]. We trained the model of 50 epochs using the

Adagrad optimizer with a learning rate of 0.01 and a learning rate decay of 1e-7.

3.2.3 CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 are wellknown benchmark datasets for image classification [26]. They consists of 10 (100) classes of $32 \times 32 \times 3$ color images, with 6,000 (600) images per class. The datasets are usually split in 50,000 training and 10,000 test images. For CIFAR-10, we use a small convolutional network with the same architecture as in [39, 41], it has two convolutional layers with max-pooling, and two dense layers, all with Tanh activations. We train the model for 50 epochs with a learning rate of 0.001 and the Adam optimizer. Each dataset has 30,000 points (i.e. 15,000 for training). Hence, we only have enough points to train one shadow model per target model. For CIFAR-100, we use a version of Alexnet [27], it has five convolutional layers with max-pooling, and to dense layers, all with ReLu activations. We train the model for 100 epochs with a learning rate of 0.0001 and the Adam optimizer. Each dataset has 60,000 points (i.e. 30,000 for training). Hence, we don't have enough points to train shadow models. However, with a smaller training set, there would be too few points of each class to allow for training.

3.2.4 UCI Adult (Census income). This dataset is extracted from the 1994 US Census database [17]. It contains 48,842 datapoints. It is based on 14 features (e.g., age, workclass, education). The goal is to predict if the yearly income of a person is above 50,000 \$. We transform the categorical features into binary form resulting in 104 features. We sub-sampled smaller datasets of 5,000 points i.e. 2,500 training and testing points for each model. For the architecture, we use a five-layer fully-connected neural network with Tanh activations. The layer sizes are [20, 20, 20, 20, 2]. We trained the model of 20 epochs using the Adagrad optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001 and a learning rate decay of 1e-7.

3.2.5 Diabetic Hospital. The dataset contains data on diabetic patients from 130 US hospitals and integrated delivery networks [51]. We use the modified version described in [25] where each patient has 127 features which are demographic (e.g. gender, race, age), administrative (e.g., length of stay), and medical (e.g., test results); the prediction task is readmission within 30 days (binary). The dataset contains 101,766 records from which we sub-sample balanced (equal numbers of patients from each class) datasets of size 10,000. Since the original dataset is heavily biased towards one class, we don't have enough points to train shadow models. As architecture, we use a four-layer fully connected neural network with Tanh activations. The layer sizes are [1024, 512, 256, 100]. We trained the model for 1,000 epochs using the Adagrad optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001 and a learning rate decay of 1e-6.

3.3 Evaluation of main experiment

Explanation-based attacks. As can be seen in Figure 1, gradientbased attacks (as well as other backpropagation-based methods, as further discussed in Section 3.5) on the Purchase and Texas datasets were successful. This result is a *clear proof of concept*, that model explanations are exploitable for membership inference. However, the attacks were ineffective for the image datasets; gradient variance fluctuates wildly between individual images, making it challenging to infer membership based on explanation variance.

⁴https://www.kaggle.com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-challenge/data ⁵https://www.dshs.texas.gov/THCIC/Hospitals/Download.shtm



Figure 1: Results for the threshold-based attacks using different attack information sources. The Optimal attack uses the optimal threshold; the SHADOW trains a shadow model on data from the same distribution, and uses an optimal threshold for the shadow model. Using three such models results in nearly optimal attack accuracy.

Loss-based and predictions-based attacks. When loss-based attacks are successful, attacks using prediction variance are nearly as successful. These results demonstrate that it is not essential to assume that the attacker knows the true label of the point of interest.

Types of datasets. The dataset type (and model architecture) greatly influences attack success. For both binary datasets (Texas and Purchase), all sources of information pose a threat. On the other hand, for the very low dimensional Hospital and Adult datasets, none of the attacks outperform random guessing. This lack of performance may be because the target models do not overfit to the training data (see Table 2), which generally limits its vulnerability to adversarial attacks [54].

Optimal threshold vs. shadow models. Shadow model-based attacks compare well to the optimal attack, with attacks based on three shadow models performing nearly at an optimal level; this is in line with results for loss-based attacks [39].

Considering the entire explanation vector. In the attacks above, we used only the variance of the explanations. Intuitively, when the model is certain about a prediction because it is for a training point, it is unlikely to change the prediction with small local perturbation. Hence, the influence (and attribution) of each feature is low. It has a smaller explanation variance. For points closer to the decision boundary, changing a feature affects the prediction more strongly. The variance of the explanation for those points should be higher. The loss minimization during training tries to "push" points away from the decision boundary. Especially, models using tanh, sigmoid, or softmax activations have steep gradients in the areas where the output changes. Training points generally don't fall into these areas.⁶ Hence, explanation variance is a sufficient parameter for deploying a successful attack. To further validate this claim, we conduct an alternative attack using the entire explanation vector as input.

The fundamental idea is to cast membership inference as a *learn-ing problem*: the attacker trains an *attack model* that, given the

output of a *target model* can predict whether or not the point \vec{x} was used during the training phase of c. The main drawback of this approach is that it assumes that the attacker has partial knowledge of the initial training set to train the attack model. Shokri et al. [41] circumvent this by training *shadow models* (models that mimic the behavior of c on the data) and demonstrate that comparable results are obtainable even when the attacker does not have access to parts of the initial training set. As we compare the results to the optimal threshold, it is appropriate to compare with a model that is trained using parts of the actual dataset. This setting allows for a stronger attack.

The specific attack architecture, we use in this section, is a neural network inspired by the architecture of Shokri et al. [41]. The network has fully connected layers of sizes [r, 1024, 512, 64, 256, 64, 1], where r is the dimension of the respective explanation vector. We use ReLu activations between layers and initialize weights in a manner similar to Shokri et al. [41] to ensure a valid comparison between the methods. We trained the attack model for 15 epochs using the Adagrad optimizer with a learning rate 0.01 of and a learning rate decay of 1e-7. As data for the attacker, we used 20,000 explanations generated by the target 10,000 each for members and non-members. The training testing split for the attacker was 0.7 to 0.3. We repeated the experiment 10 times. We omitted CIFAR-100 for computational reasons.

As can be seen in Figure 2, attacks based on the entire explanation perform slightly better than attacks based only on the variance. However, they are qualitatively the same and still perform very poorly for CIFAR-10, Adult, and Hospital.

3.4 Combining different information sources

The learning attacks described in the previous paragraph allow for a combination of different information sources. For example, an attacker can train an attack network using both the prediction and the explanation as input. Experiments on combining the three information sources (explanation, prediction, and loss) lead to outcomes identical to the strongest used information source. Especially if the loss is available to an attacker, we could not find evidence that either the prediction vector or an explanation reveals additional information.

 $^{^6 {\}rm The}$ high variance described here results from higher absolute values. Instead of the variance, an attacker could use the 1-norm. In our experiments, there was no difference between using 1-norm and using the variance. We decided to use variance to be more consistent with the attacks based on the prediction threshold.



Figure 2: A comparison between attacks using only the variance of the gradient and attacks using the entire gradient explanation as input.



Figure 3: Results for the threshold-based attacks using different backpropagation-based explanations as sources of information for the attacker.

3.5 Results for other backpropagation-based explanations

Besides the gradient, several other explanation methods based on backpropagation have been proposed. We conducted the attack described in Section 2.2 replacing the gradient with some other popular of these explanation methods. The techniques are all implemented in the INNVESTIGATE library⁷ [4]. An in-depth discussion of some of these measures, and the relations between them, can also be found in [5]. As can be seen in Figure 3 on the Purchase, Texas, and CIFAR-10 datasets, the results for other backpropagation based methods are relatively similar to the attack based on the gradient. Integrated gradients performing most similar to the gradient. For Adult, Hospital and CIFAR-100 small-scale experiments indicated that this type of attack would not be successful for these explanations as well, we omitted the datasets from further analysis.

4 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS OF INFORMATION LEAKAGE

In this section, we provide further going analysis to validate our hypothesis and broaden understanding.

4.1 The Influence of the Input Dimension

The experiments in Section 3 indicate that $Var(\nabla c(\vec{x}))$, and $||\nabla c(\vec{x})||_1$ predict training set membership. In other words, high absolute gradient values at a point \vec{x} signal that \vec{x} is *not* part of the training data: the classifier is uncertain about the label of \vec{x} , paving the way towards a potential attack. Let us next study this phenomenon on synthetic datasets, and the extent to which an adversary can exploit model gradient information in order to conduct membership inference attacks. The use of artificially generated datasets offers us control over the problem complexity, and helps identify important facets of information leaks.

To generate datasets, we use the Sklearn python library.⁸ For n features, the function creates an n-dimensional hypercube, picks a vertex from the hypercube as center of each class, and samples points normally distributed around the centers. In our experiments, the number of classes is either 2 or 100 while the number of features is between 1 to 10,000 in the following steps,

 $n \in \{1, 2, 5, 10, 14, 20, 50, 100, 127, 200, 500, 600, 1000, 2000, 3072, 5000, 6000, 10000\}.$

For each experiment, we sample 20,000 points and split them evenly into training and test set. We train a fully connected neural network with two hidden layers with fifty nodes each, the tanh activation function between the layers, and softmax as the final activation. The network is trained using Adagrad with learning rate of 0.01 and learning rate decay of 1e - 7 for 100 epochs.

Increasing the number of features does not increase the complexity of the learning problem as long as the number of classes is fixed. However, the dimensionality of the hyper-plane increases, making its description more complex. Furthermore, for a fixed sample size, the dataset becomes increasingly sparse, potentially increasing the number of points close to a decision boundary. Increasing the number of classes increases the complexity of the learning problem.

Figure 4 shows the correlation between $||\nabla c(\vec{x})||_1$ and training membership. For datasets with a small number of features ($\leq 10^2$) there is almost no correlation. This corresponds to the failure of the attack for Adult and the Hospital dataset. When the number of features is in the range $(10^3 \sim 10^4)$ there is a correlation, which starts to decrease when the data dimension is further increased. The number of classes seems to play only a minor role; however, a closer look at training and test accuracy reveals that the actual behavior is quite different. For two classes and a small number of features training and testing accuracy are both high (almost 100%), around $n = 10^2$ the testing accuracy starts to drop (the model overfits) and at $n = 10^3$ the training accuracy starts to drop as well reducing the overfitting. For 100 classes the testing accuracy is always low and only between $10^3 \le n \le 10^4$ the training accuracy is high, leading to overfitting, just on a lower level. We also conduct experiments with networks of smaller/larger capacity, which have qualitatively

⁷https://github.com/albermax/innvestigate

⁸ the make_classification function https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/ generated/sklearn.datasets.make_classification.html



Figure 4: The correlation between $||\nabla c(\vec{x})||_1$ and training membership for synthetic datasets for increasing number of features *n* and different number of classes $k \in \{2, 100\}$



Figure 5: The attack accuracy of the attacker increases with increasing number of epochs.

similar behavior. However, the interval of n in which correlation exists and the amount of correlation varies .

4.2 Using individual thresholds

Sablayrolles et al. [39] proposed an attack where the attacker obtains a specific threshold for each point (instead of one per model). However, to be able to obtain such a threshold, the attacker would need to train shadow models including the point of interest. This situation would require knowledge of the true label of the point. This conflicts with the assumption that when using explanations (or predictions) for the attack the attacker does not have access to these true labels. Furthermore, Sablayrolles et al. [39] results suggest that this attack only very mildly improves performance.

4.3 Influence of overfitting

Yeom et al. [54] show that *overfitting significantly influences the accuracy of membership inference attacks*. To test the effect of overfitting, we vary the number of iterations of training achieving different accuracies. In line with previous findings for loss-based attacks, our threshold-based attacks using explanations and predictions work better on overfitted models; see Figure 5.



Figure 6: Attacks using LIMEor SmoothGrad do not outperform random guessing in any of our experiments.

5 PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF PERTURBATION-BASED EXPLANATIONS

Neither the threshold-based attacks described in Section 2.2 nor the learning-based attacks in Section 3.3 outperform random guessing when given access to the SmoothGrad [48]. Given that SmoothGrad is using sampling rather than a few backpropagations, it is inherently different from the other explanations we considered so far. We discuss the differences in this section.

5.1 Attacks using LIME explanation

As a second perturbation-based method, we looked at the popular explanation method LIME [45]. The type of attack is the same as described in Section 2.2. We use an optimal threshold based on the variance of the explanation. However, the calculation of LIME explanations takes considerably longer than the computation of other methods we considered. Every single instance computes for a few seconds. Running experiments with 10,000 or more explanations would take weeks to months. To save time and energy, we restricted the analysis of the information-leakage of LIME to smaller-scale experiments where the models train on 1,000 points, and the attacks run on 2,000 points each (1,000 members and 1,000 non-members). We also repeated each experiment only 20 times instead of 100 as for the others. Furthermore, given that the experiments for the other explanations indicated that only for Purchase and Texas the attack was likely to be successful, we restricted our experiments to these two datasets. Figure 6 shows the results for these attacks. To ensure that it is not the different setting that determines the outcome, we also rerun the attacks for the gradient and SmoothGrad explanations, as well as the attack using the prediction variance in this new setting. Neither LIME nor SmoothGrad outperforms random guessing. For the Purchase dataset, however, the attack using the gradient variance fails as well. As a final interesting observation, which we are unable to explain at the moment: For the Texas dataset, the gradient-based attack performs better than on the larger dataset (shown in Figure 1) it even outperforms the attack based on the prediction in this specific setting. Something we want to explore further in future works.

5.2 Analysis

While it is entirely possible that perturbation-based methods are vulnerable to membership inference, we conjecture that this is not the case. This conjecture is due to an interesting connection between perturbation-based model explanations and the data-manifold hypothesis [19]. The data-manifold hypothesis states that "data tend to lie near a low dimensional manifold" [19, p. 984]. Many works support this hypothesis [9, 10, 31], and use it to explain the pervasiveness of adversarial examples [20]. To the best of our knowledge, little is known on how models generally perform outside of the data manifold. In fact, it is not even clear how one would measure performance of a model on points outside of the training data distribution: they do not have any natural labels. Research on creating more robust models aims at decreasing model sensitivity to small perturbations, including those yielding points outside of the manifold. However, robustness results in vulnerability to membership inference [49]. Perturbation-based explanation methods have been criticized for not following the distribution of the training data and violating the manifold hypothesis [28, 52]. Slack et al. [46] demonstrate how a malicious actor can differentiate normal queries to a model from queries generated by LIME and QII, and so make a biased model appear fair during an audit. Indeed, the resilience of perturbation-based explanations to membership inference attacks may very well stem from the fact that query points that the model is not trained over, and for which model behavior is completely unspecified. One can argue that the fact that these explanations do not convey membership information is a major *flaw* of this type of explanations. Given that the results in the previous section indicate that for many training points the model heavily overfits - to the extent that it effectively "memorizes" labels - an explanation should reflect that.

6 BROADER IMPACT

AI governance frameworks call for transparency and privacy for machine learning systems.⁹ Our work investigates the potential negative impact of explaining machine learning models, in particular, it shows that offering model explanations may come at the cost of user privacy. The demand for automated model explanations led to the emergence of model explanation suites and startups. However, none of the currently offered model explanation technologies offer any provable privacy guarantees. This work has, to an extent, arisen from discussion with colleagues in industry and AI governance; both expressed a great deal of interest in the potential impact of our work on the ongoing debate over model explainability and its potential effects on user privacy.

One of the more immediate risks is that a real-world malicious entity uses our work as the stepping stone towards an attack on a deployed ML system. While our work is still preliminary, this is certainly a potential risk. Granted, our work is still at the proofof-concept level, and several practical hurdles must be overcome in order to make it into a fully-fledged deployed model, but nevertheless the risk exists. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, model explanation toolkits have not been applied commercially on high-stakes data. Once such explanation systems are deployed on high-stakes data (e.g., for explaining patient health records or financial transactions), a formal exploration of their privacy risks (as is offered in this work) is necessary.

Another potential impact — which is, in the authors' opinion, more important - is that our work raises the question whether there is an *inevitable* conflict between explaining ML models – the celebrated "right to explanation" - and preserving user privacy. This tradeoff needs to be communicated beyond the ML research community, to legal scholars and policymakers. Furthermore, some results on example-based explanations suggest that the explainability/privacy conflict might disparately impact minority groups: their data is either likelier to be revealed, else they will receive low quality explanations. We do not wish to make a moral stand in this work: explainability, privacy and fairness are all noble goals that we should aspire to achieve. Ultimately, it is our responsibility to explain the capabilities - and limitations - of technologies for maintaining a fair and transparent AI ecosystem to those who design policies that govern them, and to various stakeholders. Indeed, this research paper is part of a greater research agenda on transparency and privacy in AI, and the authors have initiated several discussions with researchers working on AI governance. The tradeoff between privacy and explainability is not new to the legal landscape [8]; we are in fact optimistic about finding model explanation methods that do not violate user privacy, though this will likely come at a cost to explanation quality.

Finally, we hope that this work sheds further light on what constitutes a *good* model explanation. The recent wave of research on model explanations has been recently criticized for lacking a focus on actual usability [23], and for being far from what humans would consider helpful. It is challenging to mathematically capture human perceptions of explanation quality. However, our privacy perspective does shed some light on when explanations are not useful: explanations that offer no information on the model are likely to be less human usable (note that from our privacy perspective, we do not want private user information to be revealed, but revealing some model information is acceptable).

7 RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSIONS

Milli et al. [30] show that gradient-based explanations can be used to reconstruct the underlying model; in recent work, a similar reconstruction is demonstrated based on counterfactual explanations [3] this serves as additional evidence of the vulnerability of transparency reports. However, copying the behavior of a model is different from the inference of its training data. While the former is unavoidable, as long the model is accessible, the latter is more likely an undesired side effect of current methods. There exists some work on the defense against privacy leakage in advanced machine learning models. Abadi et al. [1] and Papernot et al. [34] have designed frameworks for differentially private training of deep learning models, and Nasr, Shokri, and Houmansadr [32] proposes adversarial regularization. However, training accurate and privacypreserving models is still a challenging research problem. Besides, the effect of these techniques (notably the randomness they induce) on model transparency is unknown. Finally, designing safe transparency reports is an important research direction: one needs to

⁹See, for example, the white paper by the European Commission on Artificial Intelligence – A European approach to excellence and trust: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/ info/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf

release explanations that are both safe and formally useful. For example, releasing no explanation (or random noise) is guaranteed to be safe, but is not useful; example-based methods are useful but cannot be considered safe. Quantifying the quality/privacy trade-off in model explanations will help us understand the capacity to which one can explain model decisions while maintaining data integrity.

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